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What	  do	  we	  mean	  by	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  of	  Brexit?	  	  
A	  view	  from	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  




The	  United	  Kingdom’s	  withdrawal	   from	   the	  European	  Union	  has	  already	   resulted	   in	   three	  
significant	   pieces	   of	   legislation	   for	   the	   UK	   Parliament	   to	   scrutinize:	   the	   European	   Union	  
(Notification	  of	  Withdrawal)	  Bill	   in	   the	  2016-­‐17	  session;	   the	  European	  Union	   (Withdrawal)	  
Bill;	   and	   the	   Taxation	   (Cross	   Border	   Trade)	   Bill	   in	   the	   2017-­‐19	   session,	   all	   three	   of	  which	  
went	   on	   to	   receive	   Royal	   Assent.	  We	   explore	   here	   the	   type	   and	   quality	   of	   parliamentary	  
scrutiny	   of	   the	   first	   of	   these	   bills.	   Scrutiny	   is	   an	   ambiguous	   concept,	   contingent	   upon	   a	  
legislatures’	  constitutional	  and	  procedural	  rules,	  but	   it	   is	  also	  contingent	  on	  the	  stances	  of	  
particular	   actors	   –	   including	   government,	   opposition,	   parliamentary	   committees	   and	  
outside	   observers.	   We	   explore	   here	   the	   perspectives	   of	   key	   actors	   during	   the	   House	   of	  
Commons’	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   (Notification	   of	  Withdrawal)	   Bill.	   Our	   analysis	  
finds	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  parliament’s	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  bill	  shifts,	  depending	  on	  who	  is	  asking	  
the	   question,	   their	   objectives,	   the	   object	   of	   their	   scrutiny	   and	   the	   forum	   in	   which	   the	  
question	   is	  being	  asked.	   In	  short,	   the	  meanings	  attributed	  to	  scrutiny	  of	  EU	  withdrawal	   in	  
the	   UK	   broadly	   correspond	   to	   the	   various	   constitutional,	   procedural	   and	   party-­‐political	  





The	   referendum	   of	   June	   2016	   had	   provided	   a	   slim	   mandate	   for	   the	   United	   Kingdom’s	  
withdrawal	   from	   the	   European	   Union,	   but	   legislation	   was	   needed	   to	   provide	   the	   legal	  
authority	   for	   the	   UK	   to	   leave.	   	   	   The	   European	   Union	   (Notification	   of	   Withdrawal)	   Bill	  
(hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  EUNOW	  Bill)	  was	  introduced	  following	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court’s	  
(UKSC)	   judgement	   in	  R	  (Miller)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Exiting	  the	  European	  Union	  on	  24th	  
January	  2017.	  This	  stated	  that	  the	  Government	  could	  not	  trigger	  Article	  50	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  
the	  European	  Union	  via	  its	  prerogative	  powers.	  The	  requirements	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  50	  and	  
the	   impact	  of	   leaving	  the	  EU	  on	  domestic	   rights	  meant	   that	  only	  Parliament	  could	   initiate	  
the	  withdrawal	  process	  via	  primary	  legislation.	  
	  
As	  the	  name	  suggests,	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  Bill	  was	  not	  to	  set	  out	  the	  detail	  of	  the	  terms	  
of	  UK	  withdrawal.	  Rather,	  it	  would	  give	  legal	  effect	  to	  the	  referendum	  result,	  conferring	  on	  
the	   UK	   Government	   the	   authority	   to	   give	   official	   notice	   to	   the	   European	   Council	   by	  
triggering	  the	  Article	  50	  process.	   	  David	  Davis	  confirmed	  this	  as	  he	   introduced	  the	  second	  
reading	  debate	  for	  the	  EUNOW	  Bill:	  	  
	  
‘it	   is	  not	  a	  Bill	  about	  whether	  the	  UK	  should	   leave	  the	  European	  Union,	  or,	   indeed,	  
about	   how	   it	   should	   do	   so;	   it	   is	   simply	   about	   Parliament	   empowering	   the	  
Government	  to	  implement	  a	  decision	  already	  made’	  (HC	  Debates,	  31st	  January	  2017).	  	  	  
	  




“A	   Bill	   to	   confer	   power	   on	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   to	   notify,	   under	   Article	   50(2)	   of	   the	  
Treaty	  on	  European	  Union,	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  intention	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  EU”	  
(European	  Union	  (Notification	  of	  Withdrawal),	  HC	  Bill	  132	  (2016-­‐17))	  
	  
Indeed,	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  had	  already	  supported	  a	  motion	  to	  trigger	  Article	  50	  by	  the	  
end	  of	  March	  2017,	  just	  six	  weeks	  prior	  to	  this	  (HC	  Debates,	  7	  December	  2016).	  On	  paper,	  
then,	  the	  bill	  was	  simply	  a	  means	  of	  legislating	  for	  something	  which	  Parliament	  had	  already	  
consented	  to.	  In	  theory,	  this	  should	  have	  been	  a	  straightforward	  piece	  of	  legislation.	  
	  
The	  EUNOW	  bill	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  on	  26th	  January	  2017,	  and	  had	  its	  
second	   reading	   debate	   the	   following	   week	   (31st	   January).	   It	   was	   a	   very	   short	   piece	   of	  
legislation,	   comprising	   only	   two	   clauses	   and	   just	   137	   words.	   From	   the	   government’s	  
perspective,	   it	  was	   ‘the	  most	   straightforward	   possible	   Bill’	   (David	  Davis,	   HC	  Debates,	   31st	  
January	  2017).	  But	  for	  others,	  the	  bill	  was	  highly	  controversial.	  Media	  reports	  stressed	  that	  
the	   short	  design	  of	   the	   legislation	  was	  a	  deliberate	  action	  by	   the	  government	   in	  order	   to	  
make	   the	  bill	   ‘bombproof’	  and	  not	  susceptible	   to	  amendment	   (e.g.	  Merrick	  2016;	  Reuters	  
2016).	  The	  government	  however,	  insisted	  otherwise	  (See,	  for	  example,	  David	  Lidington,	  HC	  
Debates	   1	   December	   2016,	   c1674).	   	   Parliamentarians	   had	   mixed	   feelings	   about	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  legislation.	  Some	  MPs	  spoke	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  ‘constitutional	  
crisis’	  if	  it	  were	  not	  passed	  by	  Parliament	  (HC	  Debates,	  1	  February	  2017,	  c1034)	  while	  others	  
saw	   it	  as	  an	  opportunity	   to	  ensure	   that	   ‘Parliament	  has	  a	   say’	  over	   the	  entire	  withdrawal	  
process	  (ibid,	  c1042).	  	  	  
	  
As	  a	   result	  of	   its	   importance	   to	  MPs	  and	   to	   the	  wider	   issue	  of	  negotiating	   the	  process	  of	  
Brexit,	  the	  EUNOW	  bill	  was	  scrutinised	  as	  a	  bill	  of	  constitutional	  significance,	  and	  received	  
its	  detailed	  line-­‐by-­‐line	  scrutiny	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  Commons	  in	  a	  Committee	  of	  the	  Whole	  
House.	   From	  a	  procedural	  perspective,	   this	  meant	   that	   rather	   than	  being	   scrutinised	  by	  a	  
small	   group	   of	  MPs	   in	   a	   public	   bill	   committee,	   it	   would	   be	   given	   a	  more	   prominent	   and	  
visible	  committee	  stage	  in	  which	  any	  MP	  could	  speak	  and	  table	  amendments	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  
the	   House	   of	   Commons	   chamber.	   However,	   despite	   many	   hours	   of	   debate	   and	   a	   high	  
volume	   of	   amendments	   from	  MPs,	   the	   bill	   left	   the	   Commons	   completely	   unscathed.	   No	  
amendments	  at	  all	  were	  made..	  	  	  
	  
As	  Julie	  Smith	  discusses	  in	  chapter	  x,	  the	  	  EUNOW	  bill	  was	  challenged	  again	  by	  the	  House	  of	  
Lords,	   before	   receiving	   Royal	   Assent	   in	   March	   2017.	   This	   initial	   piece	   of	   legislation	   was	  
followed	   by	   a	   much	   longer	   and	   more	   complex	   European	   Union	   (Withdrawal)	   Bill	   in	   the	  
2017-­‐19	  session,	  which	  provided	  for	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972	  (the	  
core	   enabling	   legislation	   for	   the	   UK’s	   accession	   to	   the	   European	   Communities)	   and	  
established	  the	  process	  by	  which	  existing	  EU	   legislation	  would	  be	  retained	  or	  modified	  by	  
government	  ministers.	  Further	   legislation	  dealing	  with	  the	  complexities	  of	  Brexit	   followed,	  
beginning	   with	   the	   Taxation	   (Cross	   Border	   Trade)	   Bill	   which	   made	   its	   way	   through	  
Parliament	  during	  2018.	  	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  relative	  constitutional	  significance	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  bill,	  the	  opportunity	  for	  all	  MPs	  
to	  engage	  actively	  in	  its	  scrutiny	  and	  the	  widespread	  discussion	  of	  it	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  
Parliament,	   it	   presents	   an	   interesting	   opportunity	   to	   explore	   different	   perceptions	   of	  
parliamentary	   scrutiny.	   The	   EUNOW	  Bill	   is	   thus	   used	   here	   as	   a	   case	   study	   to	   explore	   the	  
3	  
	  
different	  qualitative	  understandings	  of	  scrutiny	  from	  a	  constitutional,	  procedural	  and	  party-­‐
political	   perspective,	   and	   to	   begin	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   assessment	   of	   parliament’s	  
scrutiny	  of	  the	  bill,	  and	  of	  the	  opinions	  of	  different	  actors	  about	  how	  well	  Parliament	  carried	  
out	  its	  scrutiny	  role.	  	  
	  
If	  we	  want	  to	  assess	  how	  well	  Parliament	  carried	  out	  its	  scrutiny	  role,	  however,	  we	  should	  
ask	  a	  prior	  question:	  what	  do	  we	  mean	  by	  parliamentary	  scrutiny?	  The	  answer	  to	  that	  is	  far	  
from	  clear.	  The	  aim	  of	   this	  chapter	   is	   to	  explore	   this	  question,	   through	  an	  examination	  of	  
views	  of	  different	  parliamentary	  and	  extra-­‐parliamentary	  actors	  in	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to,	  
during	  and	  following	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  bill.	  
	  
Framing	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  	  
	  
Parliamentary	   scrutiny	   would	   seem	   to	   be—to	   paraphrase	   Mark	   Bovens—‘one	   of	   those	  
golden	  concepts	  that	  no	  one	  can	  be	  against’	  (Bovens	  2007,	  pp.	  447-­‐8).	  Certainly,	  there	  was	  a	  
consensus	  about	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  EUNOW	  bill:	  that	  it	  was	  generally	  
a	  Good	  Thing.1	  Thus,	  Helen	  Goodman	  MP,	  a	  Labour	  backbencher	  said	  during	  the	  committee	  
stage	  of	   the	  Bill	   that	   the	  quantity	  of	  amendments	   tabled	  by	  MPs	  showed	  why	   ‘debate	  on	  
parliamentary	   scrutiny	   is	   so	   important’	   (HC	   Debates,	   6	   February	   2017,	   c103).	   But	   at	   the	  
same	   time,	   MPs	   from	   all	   parties	   questioned	   the	   scrutiny	   work	   being	   performed	   in	   the	  
Commons	   throughout	   the	  passage	  of	   the	  bill,	  with	  many	   considering	   it	   to	  be	   lacking.	   The	  
suggested	   reasons	   for	   the	   weakness	   of	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   included	   executive	  
dominance;	   the	   limited	   capacities	   of	   Parliament	   and	   parliamentarians;	   limited	   time	   and	  
resources.	  	  	  
	  
We	  suggest	   that	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  has	  a	  number	  of	  aspects	  or	  components,	   some	  of	  
which	  are	  more	  contentious	  than	  others.	  These	  properties	  illuminate	  and	  complicate	  three	  
of	  the	  four	  dimensions	  set	  out	  in	  this	  book’s	  introduction:	  the	  constitutional,	  procedural	  and	  
party-­‐political.	  	  
	  
First,	   scrutiny	   is	   shorthand	   for	   a	   range	   of	   activities	   and	   objects	   to	   be	   scrutinised.	   It	  may	  
involve	  examining	   legislation,	  executive	  action,	  the	  work	  of	  bodies	  outside	  Parliament	  and	  
the	  executive	  (such	  as	  EU	  bodies),	  or	  a	  mixture.	  These	  activities	  may	  differ	   in	  substance—
and	  purpose.	  Thus,	  although	   the	  EUNOW	  bill	  was	  being	  scrutinised	  by	   the	  UK	  Parliament,	  
Parliament	  had	  also	  been	   scrutinising	   the	  process	  of	   EU	  withdrawal	   through	  a	  number	  of	  
other	   scrutiny	   mechanisms,	   such	   as	   oral	   and	   written	   questions	   to	   ministers,	   select	  
committee	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  Brexit	  on	  policy	  and	  through	  debating	  mechanisms	  such	  
as	  opposition	  day	  debates.	  Indeed,	  as	  chapter	  [LYNCH	  ET	  AL]	  illustrates,	  MPs	  were	  creative	  
in	   their	  use	  of	  procedural	  devices	   to	   try	   to	   influence	   the	  government’s	  Brexit	  policy.	   	   Put	  
differently,	   we	   should	   be	   as	   clear	   as	   possible	   about	   what	   activity	   is	   being	   labelled	   as	  
‘parliamentary	   scrutiny’.	  Different	   activities	   can	   entail	   different	   approaches,	   requirements	  
and	  standards.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  the	  comments	  of	  David	  Davis,	   in	  response	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  European	  Union	  Committee	  report	  on	  
parliamentary	  scrutiny	  of	  Brexit	  (European	  Union	  Committee	  2016b,	  para	  8).	  	  
4	  
	  
Second,	   the	   objective—or	   objectives—of	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   matter.	   The	   objective	  
determines	   how	   scrutiny	   is	   carried	   out,	   and	   what	   the	   measure	   of	   ‘effective’	   or	   ‘good’	  
scrutiny	  is.	  Crucially,	  the	  objective	  may	  differ	  according	  to	  who	  the	  scrutineer	  is,	  and	  what	  is	  
being	  scrutinised.	  If	  we	  take	  the	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  of	  legislation,	  some	  will	  argue	  that	  is	  
ultimately	   about	   keeping	   the	   government	   in	   check;	   others	   may	   think	   the	   objective	   is	  
apolitical—to	   improve	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   legislation;	   and	   others	   again	   may	   argue	   that	  
scrutiny	   is	   less	   about	   improving	   the	   technical	   quality	   of	   legislation,	   and	   more	   about	  
providing	   political	   legitimacy	   and/or	   informing	   the	   public.	   These	   objectives	   are	   quite	  
different,2	  and	   so	   the	   measures	   of	   success	   or	   ‘impact’	   may	   also	   differ.	   In	   terms	   of	  
scrutinising	   the	  EUNOW	  Bill,	   then,	  what	  we	   see	   is	  differing	   views	  of	  what	   scrutiny	   should	  
involve:	  discussion,	  ‘technical’	  amendment	  and	  general	  criticism	  of	  the	  bill.	  	  
	  
Third,	   there	   are	   competing	   views	   on	   the	   role	   of	   politics	   in	   the	   scrutiny	   process.	   Much	  
activity	  which	  constitutes	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	   is	  adversarial	  or	  partisan—partisan	   in	  the	  
sense	  of	  scoring	  party	  or	   ‘political’	  points,	  or	  having	  some	   ‘ulterior’	  motive.	  But	   there	   is	  a	  
subset	   of	   activities	   which	   are	   seen	   as	   perhaps	   more	   ‘ideal’,	   where	   means	   and	   ends	   are	  
separated.	  This	  set	  of	  activities	   involves	  dispassionate,	  systematic	  action,	  whose	  measures	  
are	  ‘objective’,	  non-­‐political	  and	  consensual.	  This	  links	  back	  to	  the	  second	  aspect	  of	  scrutiny.	  
Those	  who	  viewed	  scrutiny	  as	  a	  mostly	  apolitical	  activity	  were	  more	   likely	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  
process	   issues	   of	   the	   EUNOW	   bill;	   while	   for	   those	   who	   viewed	   scrutiny	   as	   an	   inherently	  
political	  activity,	   the	  EUNOW	  bill	  was	  an	  opportunity	   for	  partisan	  gain	  and	  criticism	  of	   the	  
government’s	  policy	  towards	  Brexit.	  
	  
Fourth,	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   involves	   change	   or	   impact,	   but	   the	   nature	   of	   this	   impact	  
depends	   largely	   on	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   scrutineer.	   Influence	   or	   impact	   can	   range	   from	  
simply	   informing	   relevant	   parties	   (Parliament,	   parliamentarians,	   third	   parties,	   the	   media	  
and	   the	   public)	   to	   causing	   a	   shift	   in	   position	   by	   another	   actor—usually,	   a	   change	   in	  
government	  policy,	  or	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  non-­‐government	  amendment	  to	  a	  bill.	  In	  terms	  of	  
EU	  withdrawal,	  discussion	  of	   impact	   in	  the	   lead	  up	  to	  Parliament’s	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  bill	  was	  
frequently	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   Commons	   saying	   ‘no’	   to	   the	   bill	   entirely	   and	   thus	  
preventing	  its	  passage.	  Discussion	  of	  the	  amending	  the	  content	  of	  the	  bill	  came	  later.	  	  
	  
These	  are	  ‘ideal’	  properties	  of	  scrutiny.	  No	  one	  parliamentary	  actor	  will	  conform	  entirely	  to	  
one	  particular	  view	  of	  scrutiny—they	  will	  more	  likely	  hold	  different	  approaches	  in	  balance,	  
prioritising,	  depending	  on	  the	  context.	  But	  we	  can	  see	  why	  there	  is	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  
adequacy	  of	  parliamentary	  scrutiny:	  people	  may	  be	  talking	  about	  different	  activities,	  which	  
have	  different	  objectives,	  and	  therefore	  different	  measures	  of	  ‘effectiveness’.	  
	  
So	  parliamentarians	  engage	  in	  different	  kinds	  of	  scrutiny,	  and	  employ	  different	  standards	  of	  
success,	   depending	   on	   the	   circumstances.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   constitutional,	   procedural	   and	  
party-­‐political	   dimensions,	   this	  means	   that	  we	   should	  be	   careful	   how	  we	   interpret	   claims	  
that	  the	  legislature	  is	  marginalised	  by	  the	  executive;	  that	  the	  legislature	  is	  not	  making	  use	  of	  
its	  formal,	  constitutional	  powers;	  or	  that	  the	  legislature	  is	  not	  having	  an	  ‘impact’.	  We	  have	  
to	   look	   more	   closely	   at	   who	   is	   doing	   what,	   when,	   and	   to	   whom.	   ‘The	   legislature’—or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Of	  course,	  arguments	  could	  be	  made	  (and	  have	  been)	  that	  a	  constrained	  government	  is	  a	  more	  ‘effective’	  
government,	  but	  this	  turns	  on	  what	  ‘effective’	  means.	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legislative	  actors	  (individual	  members,	  parties)—may	  have	  chosen	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  particular	  
kind	  of	  scrutiny	  appropriate	  to	  the	  subject	  matter	  or	  appropriate	  at	  the	  particular	  time.	  	  
	  
Our	  examination	  of	  scrutiny	  here	  primarily	  covers	  a	  core	  forum	  heavily	  involved	  in	  scrutiny	  
of	   the	   EUNOW	   Bill:	   the	   House	   of	   Commons	   Chamber.	   In	   order	   to	   gather	   the	   views	   of	  
individual	  MPs,	   the	  Hansard	   transcripts	  of	   the	  Commons	  debate	  on	   the	  EUNOW	  Bill	  were	  
analysed.	   	  This	   included	  the	  second	  reading,	  committee	  stage,	   report	  and	  third	  reading	  of	  
the	   bill	   (31st	   January	   –	   8th	   February	   2017).	   A	   content	   analysis	   was	   used	   to	   highlight	   the	  
scrutiny	   being	   undertaken.	   This	   included	   top	   level	   codes	   such	   as	   expectations,	   time	   and	  
scrutiny	  outcomes.	  All	   amendments	  moved	  or	  discussed	  during	   the	  Commons	  Committee	  
and	   Report	   Stage	   (6th	   -­‐8th	   February	   2017)	   were	   also	   coded.	   Here,	   the	   coding	   included	  
measures	  of	  success	  or	  failure	  (accepted/rejected)	  as	  well	  as	  ministerial	  concessions	  (e.g.	  to	  
meet,	  to	  reconsider,	  to	  amend	  at	  a	  later	  stage).	  This	  enabled	  us	  to	  present	  some	  descriptive	  
statistics	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  qualitative	  comments	  made	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  
bill.	  	  	  
	  
But	   in	   order	   to	   see	   the	  particularity	   of	   scrutiny	   in	   the	  Chamber	   forum,	  we	   juxtapose	   this	  
with	  another	  forum—select	  committees—and	  media	  perceptions	  of	  scrutiny	  taking	  place	  in	  
the	   Chamber.	   We	   looked	   at	   a	   number	   of	   select	   committees—the	   Exiting	   the	   European	  
Union	  Committee,	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  European	  Union	  Scrutiny	  Committee,	  the	  House	  
of	   Lords	   European	   Union	   Committee	   and	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   Committee	   on	   the	  
Constitution—for	   discussions	   on	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   in	   the	   period	   prior	   to	   and	   shortly	  
after	  the	  EUNOW	  Bill.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  select	  committees	  try	  not	  to	  replicate	  the	  work	  
of	   the	  others.	   Thus,	   the	  Commons	   EU	   Scrutiny	  Committee	  has	   continued	   to	   focus	  on	   the	  
work	  of	  the	  EU,	  rather	  than	  the	  UK’s	  exit	  from	  the	  EU;	  the	  Brexit	  committee	  was	  established	  
only	   as	   the	   EUNOW	   bill	   was	   passing	   through	   the	   Houses;	   and	   the	   Lords	   Constitution	  
Committee,	   which	   did	   scrutinise	   the	   EUNOW	   Bill,	   did	   not	   reflect	   upon	   what	   it,	   or	   other	  
constituent	  parts,	  were	  doing	  (Committee	  on	  the	  Constitution	  2017).	  Hence,	  we	  focused	  on	  
the	  work	  of	  the	  Lords	  EU	  committee,	  who	  published	  two	  reports	  specifically	  on	  the	  matter	  
of	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	   (European	  Union	  Committee	  2016a;	  2016b).	  This	  was	  effectively	  
the	   only	   parliamentary	   body	   to	   publish	   a	   formal	   opinion	   on	   what	   the	   scrutiny	   of	   Brexit	  
should	  look	  like.	  	  
	  
Our	   analysis	   of	   the	   media’s	   perspective	   on	   scrutiny	   required	   an	   analysis	   of	   newspaper	  
coverage	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  Bill.	  Lexis	  Nexis	  was	  used	  to	  search	  for	  relevant	  articles.	  The	  time	  
period	  used	  began	  on	  the	  day	  before	  the	  bill	  was	  debated	   in	  the	  Commons	  (30th	   January)	  
and	  ended	  the	  day	  after	  the	  bill’s	  third	  reading	  (9th	  February	  2017),	  with	  the	  search	  terms	  
‘Brexit	  OR	  withdrawal	  OR	  Europe	  OR	  EU’	  being	  used.	  	  This	  search	  returned	  a	  total	  sample	  of	  
335	  articles,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  coded	  using	  the	  same	  coding	  frame	  used	  for	  MP	  contributions.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Select	  Committee	  	  
	  
We	  start	   first	  with	  the	   ‘committee’	   forum.	   It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  the	   institutional	  context	  
here.	  At	  Westminster,	   select	   committees	  are	  cross-­‐party	  bodies	  which	  primarily	   scrutinise	  
executive	  action,	  and	  on	  occasion	  legislation.	  They	  are	  composed	  of	  parliamentarians	  from	  
different	  parties	  or	  groups,	  and	  so	  achieving	  consensus	  can	  be	  difficult:	  often,	  compromises	  




Following	  the	  2016	  referendum,	  and	  prior	  to	  the	  EUNOW	  Bill,	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  European	  
Union	  Committee	  (‘the	  Lords	  EU	  Committee’)	  explicitly	  addressed	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  in	  
two	   separate	   reports	   (European	   Union	   Committee	   2016a;	   2016b).	   The	   first	   report	   was	  
broad,	   discussing	   the	   aims	   of	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   over	   Brexit	   generally.	   The	   second	  
report	   focused	  more	  on	  details,	  partly	  as	  a	   reaction	   to	   the	  government’s	   response	   to	   the	  
first	   report.	   They	   reveal	   how	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   is	   understood	   in	   one	   particular	  
legislative	  forum.	  
	  
In	   the	   reports,	   the	   EU	   Committee	   set	   out	   a	   number	   of	   justifications	   for	   parliamentary	  
scrutiny	  of	  Brexit.	  First,	  the	  Committee	  insisted	  it	  was	  “the	  right	  and	  duty	  of	  Parliament	  to	  
ensure	   that	   the	   negotiations	   are	   scrutinised	   effectively	   at	   every	   stage.”	   (European	  Union	  
Committee	  2016a,	  para	  5).	   This	   view	  of	   scrutiny	   followed	   from	   the	   separation	  of	  powers:	  
scrutiny	  was	  just	  something	  Parliament	  did,	  because	  it	  was	  the	  legislature.	  Alternatively,	   it	  
might	  be	  that	  scrutiny	  was	  a	  good	  in	  itself.	  David	  Davis	  MP,	  the	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  
Exiting	  the	  EU,	  endorsed	  this	  view	  (although	  he	  equated	  scrutiny	  with	  accountability):	  
	  
I	  have	  read	  your	  report.	  …	  parliamentary	  accountability	  …	  is	  a	  good	  in	  its	  own	  right	  
and	  does	  not	  need	   justification	  by	  our	  saying	   that	   it	  will	  make	   this	  or	   that	  process	  
better.	   The	   simple	   fact	   of	   parliamentary	   accountability	   is	   a	   good	   thing	   (European	  
Union	  Committee	  2016b,	  para	  8).	  
	  
Second,	   scrutiny	   could	   improve	   government	   effectiveness.	   It	   could	   do	   so	   in	   two	   ways:	  
through	   questioning	   and	   testing,	   mistakes	   could	   be	   rectified,	   or	   a	   particular	   position	  
strengthened	  (European	  Union	  Committee	  2016b,	  para	  15);	  or	  scrutiny	  could	   increase	  the	  
legitimacy	   of	   the	   government’s	   actions—parliamentary	   engagement	   in	   the	   process	   could	  
encourage	   acceptance	   of	   the	   result	   by	   parliamentarians	   and	   the	   public.	   Thus,	   the	  
Committee	  argued	  that	  scrutiny	  would	  “ultimately	  assist	   the	  Government	   itself,	  as	  well	  as	  
being	  in	  the	  public	  interest”	  (European	  Union	  Committee	  2016a,	  para	  6).	  	  
	  
Third,	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   would	   ensure	   accountability.	   What	   this	   meant	   was	   mostly	  
implicit.	   It	   was	   partly	   linked	   to	   transparency—the	   Committee	   stated	   that	   “effective	  
parliamentary	  scrutiny	  will	  help	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ‘audit	  trail’	  for	  future	  generations”	  
(European	   Union	   Committee	   2016a,	   para	   21).	   For	   David	   Davis,	   however,	   parliamentary	  
scrutiny	  would	   aid	   in	   electoral	   accountability,	   by	  making	   clear	  who	   did	  what,	   and	  why—
hence	   his	   view	   of	   scrutiny	   as	   meaning	   “accountability	   after	   the	   event”	   (European	   Union	  
Committee	   2016b,	   para	   9).	   But	   the	   Committee	   rejected	   Davis’	   elision	   of	   scrutiny	   and	  
accountability	   as	   incomplete.	   Scrutiny	   had	   the	   potential	   for	   influence	   in	   real	   time	   (ibid,	  
paras	  18-­‐19).	  
	  
Both	   reports	   suggested	   that	   scrutiny	   might	   take	   different	   forms	   and	   intensities.	   So,	   for	  
instance,	   the	   Lords’	  EU	  Committee	  made	  clear	   in	   its	   first	   report	   that	   some	  aspects	  of	   the	  
negotiations	   would	   not	   be	   served	   by	   complete	   transparency:	   there	   had	   to	   be	   a	   balance	  
between	  transparency	  and	  ensuring	  the	  UK’s	  position	  was	  not	  undermined.	  This	  meant	  that	  
the	   intensity	  of	   scrutiny	  would	  differ	   (European	  Union	  Committee	  2016a,	  para	  22).	   In	   the	  
second	  report,	  the	  Lords’	  EU	  Committee	  noted	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  Parliament	  could	  
scrutinize	  executive	  action	  in	  the	  different	  stages	  of	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  EU—preparation,	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formal	   negotiations,	   ratification	   and	   implementation	   (European	   Union	   Committee	   2016b,	  
paras	  20-­‐81).	  
	  
There	   are	   two	  points	   to	   emphasise	   here.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   discussions	   about	   scrutiny	   took	  
place	  within	  the	  committee	  forum.	  That	  is,	  there	  was	  pressure	  to	  ensure	  relative	  cross-­‐party	  
consensus	  over	  recommendations—hence,	  the	  variety	  of	  objectives,	  which	  were	  far	  from	  in	  
harmony	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  politics	  of	  scrutiny	  were	  largely	  suppressed.	  The	  Committee	  
remained	   mostly	   coy	   on	   the	   question	   of	   influence	   or	   impact	   of	   scrutiny,	   only	   becoming	  
more	  explicit	   in	   the	   face	  of	  David	  Davis’	   views	  of	   accountability	   after	   the	   fact—and	   then,	  
only	  to	  insist	  that	  what	  mattered	  was	  strengthening	  the	  Government’s	  position.	  We	  should	  
contrast	   this	   with	   the	   legislative	   debates	   over	   the	   EUNOW	   bill,	   where	   comments	   about	  
scrutiny	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  impact	  tended	  to	  divide	  along	  party	  lines.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  point	  is	  that	  the	  Committee	  discussed	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
process	  of	  Brexit	  as	  a	  whole—not	  just	  notification.	  Both	  reports	  were	  published	  well	  before	  
the	  outcome	  of	   the	  Miller	   case	  was	  known:	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  reports’	  publication,	   it	  was	  
still	  unclear	  if	  the	  Government	  could	  invoke	  the	  start	  of	  the	  exit	  process	  under	  Article	  50	  of	  
the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  via	  prerogative	  action	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  Parliament,	  or	  
if	  the	  consent	  of	  Parliament	  via	  domestic	  legislation	  (ie.,	  what	  became	  the	  EUNOW	  bill)	  was	  
needed.	  That	  meant	  that	  discussion	  of	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  took	  place	  in	  abstract:	  there	  
was	  no	  need	   to	   connect	   ends	   to	   the	  means.	   There	  was	  no	  need	   to	   reach	   agreement—to	  
prioritise	  a	  particular	  end.	  That	  said,	  the	  Committee	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  were	  several	  
stages	  to	  Brexit,	  which	  might	  require	  different	  kinds	  and	  levels	  of	  scrutiny.	  Legislation	  was	  
just	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  objects	  which	  could	  (and	  would)	  be	  scrutinized	  by	  parliamentarians	  
across	  the	  period	  of	  EU	  withdrawal.	  	  
	  
So	  we	  see	  here	  acknowledgement	  that	  the	  objectives,	  intensity,	  approaches	  and	  outcomes	  
of	  parliamentary	   scrutiny	  are	   context-­‐dependent.	   There	   is	  no	   ‘set’	   standard	  of	   scrutiny:	   it	  
depends	  on	  what	   ‘Parliament’	   thinks	   is	   important—and	   this	   can	  depend	  on	  all	  manner	  of	  
things.	  	  
	  
The	  Chamber:	  Government	  and	  Opposition	  expectations	  of	  scrutiny	  
The	  floor	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  is	  a	  useful	  place	  to	  uncover	  what	  ‘Parliament’	  thought	  
was	   important	  when	   scrutinizing	   the	  EUNOW	  bill.	  MPs	  offered	   suggestions	  as	   to	  how	   the	  
bill’s	  scrutiny	  should	  proceed,	  and	  identified	  what	  in	  their	  view	  were	  the	  main	  objectives	  of	  
this	   scrutiny.	   These	   remarks	   came	   in	   the	   form	  of	   questions	   to	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   to	  
Brexit	  Minister	  David	  Davis,	   and	   continued	  once	   the	  parliamentary	  debate	  on	   the	  bill	   got	  
underway.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  here,	  though,	  that	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  is	  not	  a	  
unified	   actor.	   Rather	   at	   this	   time	   it	   consisted	   of	   ten	   political	   parties,3	  one	   of	   whom	   (the	  
Conservative	  Party)	  was	  in	  government	  and	  nine	  of	  whom	  were	  in	  opposition.	  What	  we	  see	  
is	  a	  strong	  division	  between	  the	  government	  and	  opposition	  parties	  as	  to	  what	  the	  objective	  
of	  scrutiny	  should	  be.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This	  figure	  excludes	  the	  four	  Sinn	  Fein	  MPs	  who	  did	  not	  take	  their	  seats	  in	  the	  Commons.	  The	  DUP	  are	  
counted	  here	  as	  an	  opposition	  party,	  though	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  2017	  Parliament	  they	  are	  
supporting	  the	  minority	  Conservative	  Government’s	  legislative	  agenda	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis.	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This	  government-­‐opposition	  dynamic	  is	  clearly	  present	  during	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  all	  government	  
legislation	  in	  the	  Commons.	  But	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  EUNOW	  was	  more	  complex	  than	  this:	  there	  
were	   diverging	   views	   about	  what	   was	   being	   scrutinized.	   While	   the	   government	   saw	   the	  
Commons’	   role	   as	   being	   nothing	  more	   than	   the	   scrutiny	   of	   a	   simple	   piece	   of	   legislation,	  
some	   opposition	  MPs	   did	   not	   confine	   their	   scrutiny	   to	   that,	   viewing	   their	   role	   as	   one	   of	  
scrutinizing	  UK	  withdrawal	  as	  a	  whole.	   There	  was	   thus	   a	   continued	  back	  and	   forth	   in	   the	  
debates	  between	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  bill	  itself	  and	  broader	  scrutiny	  of	  Brexit.	  For	  instance,	  many	  
MPs	   raised	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   negotiations	   following	   the	   triggering	   of	   Article	   50,	   seeking	  
information	   about	   the	   government’s	   priorities,	   their	   plans	   to	   communicate	   progress	   to	  
Parliament,	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   parliamentary	   assent	   on	   a	   final	   deal	   (see	   for	   instance	  
Matthew	   Pennycook,	   HC	   Debates,	   8	   February	   2017,	   c58).	   This	   was	   something	   which	   the	  
government	   felt	   to	  be	   ‘illogical’	   (Mims	  Davies,	  HC	  Debates,	  8	  February	  2017,	  NC)	  and	  not	  
appropriate	  during	  the	  passage	  of	  a	  bill.	  From	  the	  government	  perspective,	  the	  EUNOW	  bill	  
was	  about	   ‘the	  triggering	  process	  only	  —nothing	  more	  than	  the	  triggering	  process’	   (David	  
Davis,	  HC	  Debates,	  24	  January	  2017,	  c176).	  Efforts	  by	  the	  opposition	  to	  portray	  the	  bill	  as	  
‘more	   important	   than	   the	   Bills	   on	   the	   Lisbon	   treaty	   and	   the	   Maastricht	   treaty’	   (see	   for	  
instance	  HC	  Debates,	  24	  January	  2017,	  c176)	  therefore	  made	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  ministers	  
responsible	  for	  taking	  the	  bill	  through	  the	  Commons.	  	  
	  
The	   divergence	   in	   objectives	   and	   expectations	   between	   government	   and	   opposition	  MPs	  
could	   also	   be	   seen	   in	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   legislation	   itself.	   For	   opposition	   members,	   ‘good’	  
scrutiny	  was	   typically	   equated	  with	   textual	   changes	  being	  made	   to	   the	  bill.	   	   For	   instance,	  
before	   the	   EUNOW	   bill’s	   committee	   stage	   (the	   first	   point	   at	   which	   the	   bill	   could	   be	  
amended),	  MPs	   sought	   confirmation	   that	   the	   government	  would	   take	   a	   positive	   attitude	  
towards	  opposition	  amendments.	  Labour	  MP	  Kate	  Hoey	  pressed	  David	  Davis	  to	  confirm	  that	  
the	   government	   ‘do	   perhaps	   want	   amendments	   that	   clarify’	   the	   withdrawal	   process	   (HC	  
Debates,	  24	   January	  2017,	   c168).	  When	   the	   committee	   stage	   commenced	  on	   the	   floor	  of	  
the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  MPs	  spoke	  of	  their	  intentions	  to	  ‘win	  with	  our	  amendments’	  (Jenny	  
Chapman,	  HC	  Debates,	  6	  February	  2017,	  c135)	  and	  to	  ‘provide	  better	  legislation’	  as	  a	  result	  
(Stephen	  Gethins,	  HC	  Debates,	  6	  February	  2017,	  c79).	  	  
	  
Thus	   scrutiny	   here	   was	   seen	   as	   adversarial;	   a	   battle	   between	   the	   two	   branches	   of	  
government	  and	  parliament.	  Government	   resistance	   to	  amendments	  often	   frustrates	  MPs	  
during	  the	  committee	  stage	  of	  all	  legislation	  (Thompson	  2015,	  pp.66-­‐67),	  but	  this	  frustration	  
was	  exacerbated	  during	  the	  committee	  stage	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  bill,	  because	  the	  government’s	  
ownership	  of	  the	  legislation	  appeared	  more	  acute.	  Joanna	  Cherry	  summed	  this	  position	  up	  
nicely,	  saying	  that	  the	  government	  ‘tell	  us	  how	  fantastic	  this	  wonderful,	  sovereign	  mother	  of	  
Parliaments	  is,	  but	  we	  are	  berated	  for	  having	  the	  effrontery	  to	  attempt	  to	  amend	  a	  Bill.	  It	  is	  
preposterous’	   (HC	   Debates,	   8	   February	   2017,	   c459).	   Scrutiny	   was	   viewed	   as	   a	   zero-­‐sum	  
game	  by	  opposition	  MPs	  during	  the	  debate,	  particularly	  from	  those	  on	  the	  Scottish	  National	  
Party	  benches.	  	  
	  
However,	  some	  MPs	  did	  articulate	  a	  more	  subtle,	  long	  term	  purpose	  to	  scrutiny	  –	  one	  which	  
was	  more	  consensual	  and	  less	  immediate.	  Caroline	  Flint,	  for	  instance,	  noted	  that	  this	  is	  ‘part	  
of	   the	   purpose	   of	   having	   these	   [EUNOW	   bill]	   debates	   in	   the	   public	   arena’,	   noting	   that	  
‘looking	  again’	  may	  mean	  revisiting	  an	  issue	  over	  a	  longer	  time	  period,	  and	  that	  this	  may	  be	  
up	  to	  ‘two	  years	  and	  beyond’	  (HC	  Debates,	  8	  February	  2017,	  c486).	  This	  was	  a	  minority	  view,	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but	   fits	  more	   closely	   with	   a	  more	   iterative	   form	   of	   scrutiny	   with	   less	   partisan	   objectives	  
(Giddings	  and	  Irwin,	  2005).	  	  	  
	  
By	   contrast,	   Government	   MPs	   rarely	   referred	   to	   the	   likelihood	   of	   amendments	   being	  
accepted	  or	  rejected	  by	  government.	  This	  was	  not,	  for	  them,	  a	  measure	  of	  effective	  scrutiny.	  
Rather,	  where	  it	  was	  discussed,	  amendments	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  in	  opposition	  to	  ‘good’	  scrutiny	  
–	   a	   device	   ‘designed	   purely	   to	   waste	   time	   and	   to	   delay’	   rather	   than	   to	   improve	   the	  
legislation	  (Kit	  Malthouse,	  HC	  Debates,	  8	  February	  2017,	  c481).	  Even	  before	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  
the	  bill	   commenced,	  Conservative	  MP	   Jacob	  Rees-­‐Mogg	  commented	   that	   ‘when	   they	   [the	  
opposition]	  say	  scrutiny,	   they	  mean	  delay’	   (HC	  Debates,	  24	   January	  2017,	  c176).	  Similarly,	  
government	  MPs	  sought	  to	  play	  down	  opposition	  success	  in	  scrutinising	  the	  EUNOW	  bill.	  For	  
instance,	  when	  the	  government	  appeared	  to	  have	  made	  a	  concession	  on	  New	  Clause	  1	  (the	  
detail	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  vote	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  Brexit	  negotiations),	  Ken	  Clarke	  warned	  
Labour’s	  Keir	  Starmer	  that	  ‘instantly	  leaping	  on	  a	  concession	  may	  be	  a	  little	  unwise	  until	  we	  
are	  quite	   clear	  what	   it	   amounts	   to?’	   (HC	  Debates,	   7	   February	   2017,	  NC).	  Opposition	  MPs	  
stressed	  quite	   forcefully	   that	  a	  concession	  on	  such	  a	  significant	  piece	  of	   legislation	  should	  
justify	  an	  amendment	   from	  the	  government,	  as	   though	   the	  significance	  of	   the	  concession	  
could	  only	   be	   shown	   through	  a	  physical	   change	   to	   the	   legislation	   itself.	   Alex	   Salmond	   for	  
instance	  stated	  that	  ‘if	  one	  makes	  a	  serious	  announcement	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Committee	  
stage	  of	  a	  Bill	  of	   this	   importance,	   it	   should	  be	   followed	  by	  an	  amendment	   (HC	  Debates,	  7	  
February	   2017).	   	  He	   came	  back	   to	   this	   issue	   later	   on,	   saying	  once	   again	   that	   ‘it	  might	   be	  
better	  to	  have	  something	  in	  writing	  in	  the	  Bill,	  rather	  than	  all	  these	  warm	  words,	  cups	  of	  tea	  
and	  assurances’	  (HC	  Debates,	  8	  February	  2017,	  c473).	   	  There	  was	  an	  implication	  here	  then	  
that	  what	  scrutiny	  required	  was	  contingent	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  bill.	  	  
	  
If	  opposition	  MPs	  espoused	  an	  amendment-­‐driven	  definition	  of	  good	  scrutiny,	  government	  
MPs	   instead	   stressed	   the	   view	   that	   scrutiny	   was	   primarily	   about	   open	   and	   transparent	  
debate.	   So	   references	   to	   the	   time	   spent	   debating	   the	   EUNOW	   bill	   in	   the	   chamber	   were	  
commonplace.	   Before	   the	   timetable	   for	   scrutiny	   had	   been	   released	   by	   the	   whips,	   David	  
Davis	   told	   the	   House	   that	   he	   wanted	   ‘as	   much	   time	   as	   we	   can	   possibly	   get	   for	   it	   to	   be	  
discussed’	   (HC	   Debates,	   24	   January	   2017,	   c176).	   Tellingly,	   he	   used	   the	   word	   ‘discussed’,	  
rather	   than	   anything	   which	   suggested	   a	   more	   change-­‐oriented	   notion	   of	   scrutiny.	   It	  
complemented	   his	   comments	   to	   the	   Lords	   EU	   Committee	   that	   scrutiny	   did	   ‘not	   need	  
justification	   by	   our	   saying	   that	   it	   will	   make	   this	   or	   that	   process	   better’	   (European	   Union	  
Committee	   2016a,	   para	   8).	   When	   the	   committee	   stage	   of	   the	   bill	   began,	   Mark	   Harper	  
aligned	   himself	   with	   this	   view,	   noting	   that	   the	   House	   ‘has	   spent	   a	   lot	   of	   time,	   as	   is	  
appropriate’	  debating	  the	  bill	  (HC	  Debates,	  6	  February	  2017,	  c64).	  	  Here,	  scrutiny	  is	  seen	  to	  
be	  fulfilling	  a	  legitimation	  function.	  	  	  
	  
There	  was	  also	  a	  clear	  difference	  between	  the	  attitude	  of	  government	  MPs	  and	  the	  attitude	  
of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   House.	   Government	   MPs	   suggested	   that	   time	   should	   be	   allocated	   in	  
proportion	   to	   the	   size	   and	   length	   of	   the	   bill	   itself:	   thus	   former	   Chief	  Whip	  Mark	   Harper	  
stated	   that	   three	   days	   of	   ‘protected	   time’	   to	   debate	   the	   legislation	   in	   committee	  was	   ‘if	  
anything,	  an	  excess	  of	  generosity’	  for	  a	  two	  clause	  bill	  (HC	  Debates,	  6	  February	  2017).	  	  There	  
was	  also	   the	  view	   that	   legislation	  could	  be	   improved	  without	  any	  changes	   to	   its	  wording.	  
Peter	  Bone	  for	  example,	  said	  that	  ‘no	  Bill	  that	  goes	  through	  parliamentary	  scrutiny	  does	  not	  
become,	   as	   a	   result,	   a	   better	   Act	   of	   Parliament’	   and	   urged	   David	   Davis	   to	   set	   aside	  
10	  
	  
appropriate	   time	   for	   debate.	  Here,	   once	   again,	   the	   implied	  objective	  was	   legitimation	   via	  
debate;	   it	   followed	   that	   there	   was	   no	  mention	   of	   textual	   amendment	   (linked	   to	   a	  more	  
partisan-­‐oriented	  objective).  	  
	  
Opposition	  MPs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  saw	  time	  not	  as	  a	  legitimising	  feature	  of	  scrutiny,	  but	  as	  
a	  facilitator	  of	  the	  real	  purpose	  of	  scrutiny	  -­‐	  making	  better	  legislation	  through	  amendment.	  
They	  spoke	  of	  government	   trying	   to	   ‘gag	  Parliament’	   (Chris	   Leslie,	  HC	  Debates	  6	  February	  
2017,	  c96),	  accused	  them	  of	  ‘muzzling	  Members’	  (Chris	  Leslie,	  HC	  Debates	  6	  February	  2017,	  
c96;	   see	  also	  Chuka	  Umunna,	  HC	  Debates,	  26	   January	  2017,	  c464)	  and	  argued	   that	   it	  was	  
‘totally	   farcical’	   that	   they	  were	  unable	   to	   speak	   to	  all	  of	   their	  proposed	  amendments	  and	  
new	  clauses	  (Chris	  Leslie,	  HC	  Debates,	  8	  February	  2017,	  c521).	  Keir	  Starmer	  argued	  that	  the	  
lack	   of	   time	   for	   scrutiny	   was	   antithetical	   to	   what	   he	   described	   as	   ‘the	   proper	   role	   of	  
Parliament’	  (HC	  Debates,	  24	  January	  2017,	  c163).	  In	  his	  conception,	  scrutiny	  should	  not	  be	  
about	  ‘minimising’	  the	  role	  of	  MPs,	  nor	  should	  it	  be	  about	  avoiding	  accepting	  amendments	  
to	   legislation.	  He	  described	   it	  as	   ‘a	  question	  of	  substance,	  not	  of	  process’,	   suggesting	  that	  
ineffective	  scrutiny	  processes	  did	  more	  than	  simply	  risk	  MPs’	  voices	  not	  being	  heard.	  They	  
had	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  resulting	  legislation	  and	  perhaps,	  on	  the	  institution	  
as	  a	  whole.	  	  
	  
Where	  amendment	  was	  not	  seen	  to	  be	  forthcoming	  or	  desirable,	  opposition	  MPs	  moved	  to	  
a	   less	   partisan	   scrutiny	   objective,	   one	   which	   emphasized	   the	   need	   for	   information,	  
transparency,	   or	   explanation	   from	   government,	   such	   as	   Chris	   Leslie’s	   request	   that	   the	  
opposition	  ‘want	  to	  know	  what	  they	  [the	  Government]	  plan	  to	  do’	  (HC	  Debates,	  6	  February	  
2017,	  c96).	  	  In	  some	  respects,	  time	  was	  still	  seen	  as	  the	  facilitator	  for	  this	  type	  of	  scrutiny,	  as	  
MPs	  needed	  time	  to	  firstly	  understand	  the	  government’s	  intentions	  before	  they	  could	  move	  
on	   to	   improve	   the	   legislation.	   This	   was	   particularly	   pressing	   given	   the	   lack	   of	   clarity	  
contained	   in	   the	   White	   Paper	   on	   leaving	   the	   EU,	   published	   after	   the	   Commons	   second	  
reading	  debate	  on	  the	  EUNOW	  bill,	  and	  just	  two	  days	  before	  its	  committee	  stage	  began	  (HM	  
Government	  2017).	  The	  SNP’s	  Patrick	  Grady	  felt	   that	  this	  meant	  there	  was	   ‘nowhere	  near	  
enough	  time	  to	  consider	  the	  massive	  implications	  of	  Brexit	  will	  actually	  mean’,	  highlighting	  
the	   hundreds	   of	   amendments	   put	   down	   by	   MPs	   to	   reinforce	   his	   claim	   (HC	   Debates,	   7	  
February	  2017,	  c370).	  	  
	  
If	   we	   look	   back	   on	   all	   of	   the	   Commons	   stages	   of	   the	   EUNOW	   bill,	   we	   can	   see	   the	   key	  
objectives	   of	   scrutiny	   privileged	   by	   parliamentarians–time	   and	   amendment	   success.	   In	  
terms	  of	  amendments,	  a	  total	  of	  73	  amendments	  and	  155	  new	  clauses	  were	  put	  before	  the	  
House	   for	   consideration	   over	   the	   three	   days	   of	   committee	   stage	   debate.4	  Four	   of	   these	  
amendments	  and	  12	  new	  clauses	  were	  pushed	  to	  a	  division;	  all	  were	  defeated.	  The	  bill	  was	  
reported	  ‘without	  amendment’	  and,	  following	  a	  further	  division,	  passed	  its	  third	  reading.	  In	  
the	   immediate	   aftermath,	   opposition	   MPs	   continued	   to	   interpret	   the	   lack	   of	   successful	  
amendments	  as	  a	   sign	  of	  poor	   scrutiny,	  describing	   it	  as	   ‘a	   sad	  day	  when	   the	  Government	  
voted	   down	   all	   the	   amendments	   so	   that	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   could	   say	   that	   the	   Bill	   was	  
unamended’	  (Valerie	  Vaz,	  HC	  Debates,	  8	  February	  2017,	  No	  Col).	  	  They	  associated	  this	  with	  
the	  ‘breakneck	  speed’	  with	  which	  the	  bill	  passed	  through	  the	  Commons	  (Pete	  Wishart,	  HC	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  did	  not	  account	  for	  all	  of	  the	  amendments	  tabled.	  Some	  were	  simply	  not	  reached	  before	  the	  cut	  off	  for	  
the	  end	  of	  committee	  stage.	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Debates,	  8	  February	  2017,	  No	  Col).	  	  Although	  the	  bill	  clearly	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  same	  degree	  
of	   unconstrained	  parliamentary	   time	   in	   the	  Commons	   as	   other	  major	   pieces	   of	   European	  
Union	   legislation—the	   Maastricht	   Treaty,	   for	   instance,	   spent	   over	   162	   hours	   just	   in	   its	  
committee	  stage	  (Miller	  2015,	  p.7)—it	  still	  received	  over	  39	  hours	  of	  debate	  in	  the	  Chamber;	  
just	   under	   18	   hours	   during	   the	   second	   reading	   debate,	   and	   just	   under	   22	   hours	   at	   its	  
committee	  stage.	  It	  did	  not	  however,	  see	  any	  debate	  at	  report	  stage	  or	  at	  third	  reading.	  It	  is	  
common	  for	  bills	  scrutinized	   in	  Committee	  of	   the	  Whole	  House	  to	  have	  no	  report	  stage	   if	  
they	   are	   unamended,	   but	   the	   combination	   of	   this	   with	   no	   debate	   at	   third	   reading	   was	  
unusual.	   Opposition	   MPs	   were	   unsurprisingly	   upset	   about	   the	   reduced	   opportunity	   for	  
debate.	  Once	  again,	   they	  stressed	  the	  notion	  that	   the	  EUNOW	  bill	  was	  extraordinary,	  and	  
more	  deserving	  of	  debate	  than	  ordinary	  legislation.	  Alex	  Salmond,	  for	  example,	  commented	  
that	   ‘for	   this	   to	  happen	  on	  any	  Bill	  would	  be	   an	   abuse;	   for	   it	   to	  happen	  on	   this	  Bill	   is	   an	  
outrage’	  (HC	  Debates,	  8	  February	  2017).	  	  
	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  a	  final	  scrutiny	  objective	  put	  forward	  by	  MPs	  during	  the	  consideration	  of	  
the	   EUNOW	   bill:	   representation	   and	   legitimacy,	   via	   contributions	   from	   as	   many	   MPs	   as	  
possible.	  This	  view	  was	  espoused	  heavily	  by	  the	  SNP,	  and	  stems	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  
result	   of	   the	   EU	   referendum	   (the	   difference	   in	   the	   Scottish	   vote),	   Commons	   procedures	  
which	  seem	  to	  constrain	  the	  party	  from	  making	  contributions	  (Thompson	  2017,	  p.	  6-­‐7)	  and	  
a	  particular	  incident	  during	  the	  committee	  stage	  of	  the	  bill	  where	  the	  party’s	  spokesperson	  
Joanna	  Cherry’s	  speech	  was	  cut	  off	  by	  the	  Speaker	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  debate.	  When	  the	  party	  
held	   the	   floor	   for	   over	   an	   hour	   in	   the	   following	   day	   of	   committee	   debate,	   they	   were	  
congratulated	  for	  making	  sure	  that	  ‘the	  voice	  of	  Scotland	  has	  been	  heard	  loud	  and	  clear	  in	  
scrutinising	  this	  bill’	  (Robin	  Walker,	  HC	  Debates,	  7	  February	  2017,	  c390;	  see	  also	  Thompson	  
2017,	   p.	   7).	   	   Government	   minister	   David	   Lidington	   praised	   the	   ingenious	   way	   in	   which	  
‘about	  half	  the	  number	  of	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  Members’	  (HC	  Debates,	  8	  February	  2017,	  
No	  Col)	  had	  been	  able	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  bill.	   	  The	  SNP	  objective	  for	  good	  
scrutiny	  was	  thus	  also	  about	  making	  the	  voices	  of	  distinct	  national	  groups	  of	  MPs	  heard	  in	  
the	  chamber.	  For	   them,	   the	  opportunity	   to	  scrutinize	  sat	  alongside	   the	  ability	   to	  make	  an	  
impact	  on	  the	  text	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  legislation.	  	  
	  
The	   MP	   ‘view’	   is	   therefore	   not	   actually	   a	   unified	   view.	   In	   the	   chamber,	   it	   mimics	   the	  
adversarial	  nature	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  with	  different	  groups	  of	  actors	  (government	  
and	   opposition)	   placing	   a	   different	   emphasis	   on	   key	   components	   of	   scrutiny.	   This	   was	  
exacerbated	  during	  discussions	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  Bill.	  Although	  both	  conceived	  of	  scrutiny	  in	  a	  
partisan	  sense,	  opposition	  MPs	  promoted	  a	  more	  change-­‐orientated	  objective,	  focusing	  on	  
textural	  amendment,	  while	  Government	  MPs	  emphasised	  debate	  as	  a	  legitimizing	  objective	  
of	  the	  bill’s	  scrutiny.	  The	  differing	  notions	  of	  the	  significance	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  bill	  between	  
government	   and	   opposition/backbench	   MPs	   added	   a	   further	   level	   of	   complexity	   to	   this	  
multifaceted	  view	  of	  scrutiny	  coming	  from	  within	  the	  House	  of	  Commons.	  	  
	  
A	  View	  from	  the	  Outside:	  the	  Media	  
If	   parliamentarians	   were	   divided	   about	   their	   views	   on	   the	   purpose	   of	   scrutiny	   and	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	   scrutiny	   in	   the	   case	  of	   the	  EUNOW	  Bill,	   there	  was	  much	  more	   consensus	  
from	  written	  media	   outlets	   at	   each	   stage	   of	   the	   bill.	   	   There	  was	   a	   focus	   throughout	   the	  
reporting	  on	  measurable	  /	  quantitative	  aspects	  of	  Parliament’s	  work,	  such	  as	  the	  length	  of	  
debates,	   the	   number	   of	   amendments	   and	   the	   outcomes	   of	   divisions.	   The	   phrases	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‘marathon’,	   ‘two	   day’	   debate	   were	   well	   used	   here	   (e.g.	   Bloom	   2017;	   Miller	   2017)	   and	  
interpreted	  as	  a	  positive	  feature	  of	  the	  ‘intense’	  scrutiny	  taking	  place	  by	  MPs	  (Thorp	  2017a).	  	  
Although	   the	   length	  of	  debating	   time	  allocated	  at	   second	   reading	  and	  committee	  stage	   is	  
not	  unusual	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  consideration	  of	  government	  legislation	  in	  the	  Commons	  
(see	  Thompson	  2015),	  it	  was	  presented	  by	  the	  press	  as	  being	  particularly	  noteworthy.	  	  	  
	  
Yet,	  while	  press	  reporting	  highlighted	  the	  length	  of	  time	  devoted	  to	  each	  individual	  stage	  of	  
the	   bill	   in	   a	   positive	   manner,	   when	   the	   scrutiny	   process	   as	   a	   whole	   was	   discussed,	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   it	   became	   more	   negative.	   	   Discussions	   of	   the	   many	   hours	   MPs	   spent	  
debating	   the	   bill	   at	   second	   reading	   sat	   alongside	   discussions	   of	   the	   very	   same	   bill’s	  	  
‘breakneck	   timetable’	   (e.g.	   Blake	   2017)	   and	   the	   ‘limited	   amount	   of	   time	   to	   discuss	  
amendments’.	  While	  seemingly	  content	  with	  the	  time	  devoted	  to	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  bill	  at	  each	  
individual	  stage,	  there	  was	  also	  an	  impression	  that	  the	  legislation	  was	  ‘being	  rushed	  through	  
Parliament’	   (Walker	   2017a).	   	   This	   was	   perhaps	   because	   the	   bill’s	   consideration	   was	  
compressed	  compared	  to	  the	  typical	   legislative	  timetable,	  with	  all	  of	  the	  Commons	  stages	  
taking	  place	  within	  just	  14	  days.	  	  Of	  the	  23	  government	  bills	  which	  reached	  Royal	  Assent	  in	  
the	  same	  parliamentary	  session,	  the	  average	  length	  of	  time	  for	  the	  Commons	  stages	  (from	  
first	   reading	   to	   third	   reading)	   was	   94	   days5.	   	   The	   only	   bills	   with	   a	   shorter	   consideration	  
related	  to	  supply	  and	  appropriations	  (in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  debate	  or	  amendments)	  and	  the	  
Northern	   Ireland	   (Ministerial	   Appointments	   and	   Regional	   Rates)	   Bill	   in	   which	   no	  
amendments	  were	  used.	  It	  was	  thus	  unusual	  that	  a	  bill	  which	  saw	  considerable	  debate	  and	  
a	   high	   number	   of	   proposed	   amendments,	   saw	   its	   passage	   condensed	   into	   such	   as	   short	  
amount	  of	  parliamentary	  time.	  	  	  
	  
Similarly,	  the	  overall	  assessment	  of	  the	  Commons	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  bill	  was	  also	  presented	  as	  
something	  of	  a	  failure.	   	  The	  definition	  of	  good	  scrutiny	  employed	  by	  the	  media	  seemed	  to	  
be	  textual	  change—successful	  amendments	  at	  committee	  stage.	  	  Reports	  of	  the	  committee	  
of	   the	   whole	   house	   emphasised	   the	   lack	   of	   amendments.	   We	   see	   discussion	   of	   the	  
‘unamended	  Bill’	  (e.g,	  Kay	  2017),	  ‘defeated’	  amendments	  (e.g	  Walker	  2017b).	  In	  the	  words	  
of	   one	   report,	   MPs	   ‘achieved	   precisely	   nothing’	   (Bloom	   &	  Williamson	   2017).	   	   Commons	  
scrutiny	   was	   presented	   as	   a	   personal	   battle	   between	  MPs	   and	   the	   Prime	  Minister,	   with	  
reports	   that	   Theresa	   May	   had	   ‘blocked’	   (Rodger	   2017;	   Thorp	   2017b)	   or	   steamrollered	  
(Bloom	  &	  Williamson	  2017)	  every	  proposed	  change	  to	  the	  bill.	  	  It	  is	  a	  clear	  interpretation	  of	  
scrutiny	  as	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  branches,	  and	  as	  either	  Parliament’s	  failure	  to	  fulfil	  its	  
constitutional	   role	   to	   act	   as	   a	   check	   on	   the	   executive,	   or	   of	   the	   executive	   inhibiting	  
Parliament	   from	  carrying	  out	   this	   role.	   Either	  way,	   it	   reduces	   scrutiny	   to	   a	   single	   focus:	   a	  
‘battle’	  (James	  et	  al	  2017)	  or	  ‘war’	  (Beattie	  2017)	  in	  which	  Parliament	  has	  clearly	  lost.	  This	  
clearly	   ignored	   that	   some	   parliamentarians—MPs	   and	   peers—at	   different	   stages	   and	   in	  
different	   fora,	   were	   trying	   to	   achieve	   different	   things.	   	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   some	  
parliamentarians	  see	  scrutiny	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  express	  ‘voice’	  in	  the	  chamber,	  or	  debate	  
as	  a	  means	  of	  ensuring	  legitimation.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	   debates	   leading	   up	   to	   and	   following	   the	   EUNOW	   Bill	   highlight	   in	   particular	   the	  
contentious	  nature	  of	   the	  constitutional	  and	  political	  environment	   in	  which	  the	  Commons	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  This	  is	  a	  calculation	  based	  on	  calendar	  dates,	  rather	  than	  sitting	  days.	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was	  working.	  This	  resonates	  across	  all	  Brexit	  scrutiny,	  as	  evidence	  by	  chapters	  LYNCH	  et	  al	  
and	   SMITH.	   	   It	   also	   illustrates	   the	  many	  meanings	   that	   actors—parliamentary	   and	   extra-­‐
parliamentary—impute	   to	   the	   activity	   of	   parliamentary	   scrutiny.	   These	   meanings	   do	   not	  
necessarily	  map	   onto	   those	   of	   others.	   They	   shift,	   being	   dependent	   on	  who	   is	   asking	   the	  
question,	  their	  objectives,	  the	  object	  of	  their	  scrutiny	  and	  the	  forum	  in	  which	  the	  question	  is	  
being	  asked.	  	  
	  
If	   we	   revisit	   our	   suggested	   components	   of	   scrutiny	   and	   apply	   them	   to	   the	   EUNOW	   bill	  
debates,	   we	   can	   identify	   some	   patterns	   in	   terms	   of	   different	   actors’	   expectations	   and	  
evaluations	   of	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   of	   this	   first	   piece	   of	   Brexit	   legislation.	   The	   first	  
component	   of	   scrutiny	   was	   that	   it	   is	   really	   shorthand	   for	   a	   mix	   of	   activities.	   This	   was	  
recognised,	   for	   instance,	   by	   the	   Lords	   EU	   committee,	   when	   it	   delineated	   different	  
approaches	  and	  intensities	  of	  scrutiny	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Brexit	  process.	  It	  is	  also	  apparent	  on	  
the	  floor	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  where	  there	  was	  disagreement	  among	  MPs	  as	  to	  what	  
the	  focus	  of	  scrutiny	  was	  –	  the	  text	  of	  the	  EUNOW	  bill	  itself,	  the	  content	  of	  and	  procedure	  
for	   the	   government’s	   negotiations	   and	   ‘final	   deal’	   for	   withdrawal,	   or	   the	   very	   notion	   of	  
leaving	  the	  EU	  (or	  not)	  itself.	  	  
	  
Second,	  we	  noted	  that	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  consensus	  about	  the	  appropriate	  role	  of	  politics	  
in	   parliamentary	   scrutiny.	   There	   was	   some	   agreement	   here	   in	   that	   for	   three	   of	   our	   four	  
actors	   (government,	   opposition	   and	   the	   media)	   the	   scrutiny	   of	   EUNOW	   was	   intensely	  
partisan.	   The	  manner	   in	  which	   the	  media	   presented	   the	   scrutiny	   of	   EUNOW	  as	   a	   ‘battle’	  
between	  government	  and	  Parliament	  epitomises	  the	  nature	  of	  Brexit	  scrutiny.	  Although	  this	  
is	  common	  in	  media	  depictions	  of	  most	  high	  profile	  legislation,	  the	  adversarial	  nature	  of	  this	  
process	  was	  intensified	  because	  the	  UKSC	  Miller	  decision	  placed	  the	  Article	  50	  notification	  
process	  firmly	  back	   in	  Parliament’s	  court.	  The	  select	  committee	  view	  is	  the	  only	  exception	  
here,	  but	  this	  was	  more	  related	  to	  its	  institutional	  position,	  which	  prevented	  it	  from	  taking	  
an	  overtly	  partisan	  view	  of	  scrutiny.	  
	  
We	   deal	   with	   objectives	   of	   scrutiny	   and	   the	   expectation	   of	   change	   together.	   Scrutiny	   is	  
expected	  to	  result	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  change	  or	  impact,	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  impact	  depends	  
on	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  scrutineers.	  We	  saw	  this	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  EUNOW	  Bill,	  where	  
MPs	  debated	  the	  matter	  of	  time.	  Both	  government	  and	  opposition	  MPs	  were	  in	  agreement	  
that	   time	   for	   scrutiny	   was	   important,	   but	   they	   differed	   over	   why	   this	   mattered:	   for	   the	  
opposition	  this	  was	  about	  getting	  more	  time	  to	  put	  down	  amendments	  and	  press	  for	  textual	  
change;	   for	   government	   MPs	   this	   was	   typically	   about	   ensuring	   the	   legitimation	   of	   the	  
EUNOW	  Bill.	   	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  EUNOW	  bill	   left	  the	  Commons	   in	  an	  unamended	  state	  was	  
problematic	   for	   both	   the	   press	   and	   for	   many	   non-­‐government	   MPs,	   because	   of	   the	  
alignment	   of	   their	   scrutiny	   objective	   (the	   constitutional	   role	   of	   Parliament	   in	   keeping	   the	  
government	  in	  check)	  with	  the	  need	  for	  very	  visible	  or	  quantifiable	  change.	  	  	  
	  
Our	  findings	  are	  also	  relevant	  to	  three	  of	  the	  four	  dimensions	  (the	  constitutional,	  procedural	  
and	  party-­‐political)	   set	  out	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	  book.	   In	   terms	  of	   the	  party-­‐political	  
dimension,	  governing	  and	  opposition	  parties	  have	  approached	  scrutiny	  of	  Brexit	  differently,	  
but	   this	  will	   depend	   on	   the	   specific	   arena	   or	   forum	   in	  which	   scrutiny	   takes	   place.	   In	   the	  
chamber,	   opposition	   parties	   desire	   textual	   change	   and	   governing	   parties	   resist.	   But	   in	   a	  




In	  terms	  of	  the	  constitutional	  and	  procedural	  dimensions,	  our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  we	  must	  
pay	  far	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  particular	  circumstances	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  
parliamentarians	   are	   exercising	   constitutional	   powers	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   executive.	   Similarly,	  
discussions	  of	  influence	  depend	  on	  context	  and	  specific	  intent.	  There	  is	  no	  fixed	  definition	  of	  
scrutiny	  within	  the	  UK	  constitution	  or	   in	  Parliament’s	  procedural	   rule	  books.	   If	   there	   is	  no	  
fixed	   meaning	   for	   parliamentary	   scrutiny,	   and	   its	   process	   and	   substance	   are	   largely	  
dependent	  on	  a	  contingent	  set	  of	  circumstances,	  then	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  find	  a	  measure	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